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Abstract
This article shows how Pierre Hadot’s idea of philosophy as a way of life 
can be applied to Confucian philosophy. Specifically I will show how the 
philosophy of the Confucian thinker Mencius has two characteristics 
that are indicative of a philosophy that is a way of life. For Hadot, Ancient 
Greco-Roman philosophical schools were mainly concerned, not with 
philosophical discourse, but with changing their students’ way of living. 
Based on Mencius’ own words, it can be inferred that he also believed that 
his philosophizing was mainly about transforming people, and that he 
treated philosophical discourse as ancillary to this. Furthermore, Hadot 
believed that “spiritual exercises” were employed by Ancient Greco-
Roman philosophical schools to precisely help transform the lives of 
their aspirants. He divides these spiritual exercises into two phases. The 
first is “Concentration of the I” where the aspirant ceases to identify with 
his conventional and vicious self. This leads to the second phase, namely, 
“Expansion of the I” where the aspirant becomes free to identify with the 
whole of reality. I suggest that spiritual exercises, or something similar, 
can also be seen in Mencius’ teachings. In particular, Mencius’ activity of 
“reflection and extension” can be considered a kind of “Concentration 
of the I,” whereas his intimation of attaining unity with Heaven and the 
world through cultivating qi, can be understood as a kind of “Expansion 
of the I.” 
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I. Introduction 
Pierre Hadot is known for advocating that “philosophy,” as it was 
practiced during ancient Greek and Roman times, should be under-
stood mainly as a way of life rather than merely the production of 
philosophical discourse. In antiquity, to adopt a philosophy or to 
become part of a philosophical school is an “existential option which 
demands from the individual a total change of lifestyle, a conversion 
of one’s entire being, and ultimately a certain desire to be and live in 
a certain way” (Hadot 2002, 3). This process of conversion and the 
practices for bringing it about are what Hadot calls “spiritual exer-
cises” (2002, 6). Now Classical Chinese philosophy has also been 
considered by scholars as more of a way of life than an academic 
activity. For instance, in Fung Yu-Lan’s classic A Short History of Chi­
nese Philosophy, it is stated that: 
Chinese philosophers were all of them different grades of Socrates. 
. . . His [the Chinese Philosopher] philosophy required that he live 
it; he himself its vehicle. . . . It was his business to school himself 
continually and persistently to that pure experience in which 
selfishness and egocentricity were transcended, so that he would be 
one with the universe. (Fung 1997, 10)
It is not surprising then that some of these scholars have already 
ap plied Hadot’s ideas in analysing Chinese philosophical writings 
(Stalnaker 2006; Møllgaard 2007). Indeed Hadot (2002, 112, 206) 
himself more than once cites from the Zhuangzi, a Daoist philo-	
 so phical text, in describing spiritual exercises. I intend to continue 
this dialogue between Hadot and Classical Chinese philosophy by 
showing that the philosophy of the Confucian thinker Mencius 
broadly resonates with two of Hadot’s ideas about philosophy as a 
way of life. These two ideas are (1) the relationship between philo-
sophy and philosophical discourse, and (2) spiritual exercises as con-
sisting of the two consecutive steps of “Concentration of the I” and 
“Expansion of the I.”
This article will thus proceed as follows: I shall first discuss the 
relationship between philosophy and philosophical discourse, as 
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articulated in Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of life. This 
shall be followed by an explanation of spiritual exercises and the two 
aforesaid steps of Concentration and Expansion of the I. After this, I 
will discuss Mencius’ philosophy and show how it has features that 
resonate with Hadot’s ideas. I will also show how, despite fitting into 
the conception of philosophy as a way of life, Mencius’ philosophy 
still has its own peculiar character compared to the Ancient Greco- 
Roman philosophies that Hadot discusses. I will then conclude with 
a brief consideration on how exploring philosophy as a way of life 
can be significant for philosophers in this current time. 
II. Philosophy and Philosophical Discourse
Hadot defines philosophical discourse as “‘discursive thought’ ex-
pressed in written or oral language” (2002, 4–5). Examples of these 
include the systematic articulation of a philosopher’s thought, 
and “dialectical” works such as the record of a dialogue or debate 
between philosophers. Whatever forms philosophical discourses 
might take, Hadot insists that in antiquity these were ultimately at 
the service of philosophy as a way of life. Because of the contempo-
rary understanding of philosophy as an academic field concerned 
with theoretical issues, there is a temptation to recast ancient philos-
ophy as something similar. As Hadot says:
A profound difference exists between the representations which 
the ancients made of philosophia and the representation which is 
usually made of philosophy today—at least in the case of the image 
of it which is presented to students, because of the exigencies of 
university teaching. They get the impression that all the philosophers 
they study strove in turn to invent, each in an original way, a new 
construction, systematic and abstract, intended somehow or other 
to explain the universe. . . . These theories—which one could call 
“general philosophy”—give rise, in almost all systems, to doctrines or 
criticisms of morality which, as it were, draw the consequences, both 
for individuals and for society, of the general principles of the system, 
and thus invite people to carry out a specific choice of life and adopt 
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a certain mode of behavior. The problem of knowing whether this 
choice of life will be efficacious is utterly secondary and accessory; it 
doesn’t enter into the perspective of philosophical discourse. (2002, 2) 
The current understanding of the “process” of philosophizing is 
that a philosopher would first come up with his systematic philo-
sophical theory (or discourse). This would then have practical or 
ethical corollaries which would help people to live life accordingly. 
However, it was not essential to the “philosophy” that this theory 
be lived out. In other words, what was considered “philosophy” 
was basically the theory or discourse itself. Hadot claims, however, 
that this was not the case in ancient philosophy. For him, ancient 
philosophy was understood primarily as a way of life that was meant 
to bring about a holistic transformation of the person (2002, 3). The 
different philosophical schools in antiquity therefore were precisely 
embodiments of different ways of living. To be sure, these schools 
had their own set of philosophical discourses and these were an 
essential part of their philosophizing. Ultimately however, these 
discourses were secondary in that they were meant to support the 
way of life that a school practiced (2002, 3). Such support can be 
in the form of motivating students by justifying this very way of 
life. This can be seen for instance in the Stoic school. For the Stoics, 
philosophical discourse consists of physics, ethics, and logic (2002, 
28). “Physics” describes the place of human beings in the cosmos or 
the grand scheme of things. This will have corollaries that pertain 
to how human beings should live and relate to each other. Such 
corollaries are thus laid out in the “ethics” part of philosophical 
discourse. Finally, logic defines the “rules of reasoning” that explain 
and validate the previous two parts (2002, 176). All these parts are 
meant to be a theoretical justification for the Stoic way of life, which 
in turn ultimately serves to give assurance and inspiration for the 
aspirant who endeavors to live out that way of life (2002, 175–176). 
Philosophical discourse can also serve as instructions or reminders 
to these aspirants. An example would be the use of maxims in the 
Epicurean School, one of which goes as follows: “The gods are not 
to be feared, Death is not to be dreaded; What is good is easy to 
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acquire, What is bad is easy to bear” (2002, 123). For Hadot, these 
maxims allow easy access to the core doctrines of a philosophical 
school because they are concise and are easy to memorize (2002, 
123). Through use of these, aspirants can conveniently remind and 
galvanize themselves when it comes to living out their philosophy.
Furthermore, the notion that in antiquity living out philosophy 
was primary and philosophical discourse secondary was reflected by 
how ancient philosophers often criticized those people who were 
skilled at the latter but did not pay attention to the former. For 
instance, Diogenes Laertius records Polemon, one of the heads of 
Plato’s Academy, as saying:
We should exercise ourselves with facts and not with dialectical 
speculations; otherwise, like a man who has imbibed some little 
handbook on harmony but never practiced, we may be admired for 
our ability to pose questions, but will be at variance with ourselves 
in the ordering of our lives. (Laertius 2018, 213) 
The upshot of this was that philosophical discourses themselves, 
especially those Hadot understood as spiritual exercises, were not 
expected to be as systematically coherent as their contemporary 
counterparts (Hadot 1995, 9, 105). This was particularly important for 
Hadot because scholars of ancient philosophical texts like himself 
often had a deprecatory view of their object of study since these did 
not match up to the systematic rigor of present-day philosophy (1995, 
19). A paradigmatic example would be the Meditations of Marcus 
Aurelius. The early translators of the Meditations often considered 
it as a fragment or a “mutilated” extant of a more organized ethical 
work written by the Stoic emperor (1995, 10). This was because 
the Meditations, although in some places exhibiting systematic 
arguments, was for the most part lacking in cohesion. In Hadot’s 
own words, its “sentences seem to follow one another without order, 
with the randomness of the impressions and states of soul of the 
emperor-philosopher” (1995, 10). Now this would be truly lamentable 
if the Meditations was meant to be a systematic treatise. However, as 
Hadot says, the principal purpose of philosophical discourse was not 
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to systematically relay data but “to produce a certain psychic effect 
in the reader,” that is to say, it was meant to produce in the reader 
certain attitudes that would support him in living the way of life he 
had chosen (1995, 19). The “disjointed” passages in the Meditations 
are meant to do just that by being a daily reminder to Aurelius of his 
Stoic principles.
Now one philosopher of antiquity that appears to defy Hadot’s 
claims is Aristotle. Aristotle’s emphasis on theoretical knowledge, as 
well as his numerous systematic theoretical writings, seems to paint 
him as someone for whom philosophy is the production of discourse. 
Hadot, however, believes that Aristotle’s philosophy can still be under -
stood as mainly a transformative way of life, albeit a “theore tical” one 
(2002, 80–81). This theoretical life had for its goal the contemplation 
(theoria) of the divine and immutable first causes. The activities that 
Aristotle’s school engaged in were dedicated to achieving this goal. 
Such activities included the methodical study of nature, the en hance -
ment of this study through dialectic discussion with colleagues, and 
the recording of the fruits of the study (87–88). Now these activities 
did not just fill a person with information. Rather, these also inculcated 
in aspirants certain attitudes that would make them more conducive 
for contemplation. An example would be the attitude of “disinterest-
edness” or objectivity that resulted from the attempt to study nature 
without personal preconceptions, as well as rational discussion with 
others. This objectivity in turn allowed the aspirant to detach from his 
conventional biases and look at reality in a clearer way (85–86). More 
directly, the study of nature made the aspirant conducive to con-
templation because by appreciating the beauty of natural things, he 
can similarly gain an appreciation of the beauty of the first causes 
that produce or move them (83–84). How ever, in order to be good at 
studying nature, and consequently con tem plation, it was not enough 
that one simply received the information relayed by philosophical 
discourse. Rather, one had to experience doing the study. As Aristotle 
says: 
one might . . . ask why it is that a lad may become a mathematician, 
but not a philosopher or natural scientist. Probably it is because the 
The Philosophy of Mencius as a Way of Life  49 
former subjects deal with abstractions, whereas the first principles 
of the two latter are grasped only as a result of experience; and the 
young repeat the doctrines of these without actually believing in 
them. (Nicomachean Ethics 1142a12; Aristotle [1961] 2004, 156)
Experience was also necessary, and philosophical discourse in suf-
ficient, when it came to the secondary goal of the Aristotelian way of 
life, namely, living virtuously (Nicomachean Ethics 1179b4–5; Aristotle 
[1961] 2004, 277). As a final point of consideration, philo sophical 
dis course was also insufficient in being the main purpose of the 
Aristotelian way of life because the former was a discursive activity 
while contemplation was non-discursive (Hadot 2002, 88).1 Aristotle 
believed however that humans could not engage in contemplation 
permanently, and thus had to fall back on “lesser” activities such as 
what his school practiced. Thus, these lesser activities, including 
philosophical discourse, would still be part of the Aristotelian way of 
life—although not its most important part.
III. Spiritual Exercises: Concentration and Expansion of the “I”
The above-mentioned examples of short sayings, the Meditations, 
and even Aristotelian study, illustrate how philosophical discourse 
could serve as “spiritual exercises” for the philosophical aspirant. As 
mentioned above, spiritual exercises, or askesis in Ancient Greek, are 
those practices that are meant to bring about a transformation in the 
aspirant from her original state toward the ideal one posited by her 
school. Hadot uses the term “spiritual” to indicate that such exercis-
es are meant to engage and change the whole person’s “psychism” 
which arguably means not only the person’s mind but her emotions, 
dispositions, and indeed her entire self (1995, 82). “Spiritual” also sig-
nifies the final goal of these exercises which, for Hadot, is for one to 
be elevated “to the life of the objective Spirit; that is to say, he re- 
places himself with the perspective of the Whole” (1995, 82). What 
 1  See Nathan R. Colaner (2015). Colaner shows how in On the Soul I.4 408b18–31, 
Aristotle distinguishes between contemplation and discursive thought.
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this apparently means is that through undergoing spiritual exercises, 
the philosophical aspirant achieves a kind of unity with the universe 
which then allows her to see and value things precisely from the 
“point of view” of the cosmos. The activities that fall under spiritual 
exercise are many, examples being “research (zetesis), thorough in -
vestigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), listening (akroasis), atten-
tion (prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia) . . . meditations (meletai), 
therapies of the passions, remembrance of good things . . . and the 
accomplishment of duties” (Hadot 1995, 84). Despite this variety, the 
process of spiritual exercise can be divided into two broad steps. The 
first is “Concentration of the I” which eventually leads to the second, 
namely, “Expansion of the I.” Let me begin with the first.
Hadot describes the “Concentration of the I” as “the movement 
by which the ‘I’ concentrates itself upon itself and discovers that it is 
not what it had thought. It ceases to be conflated with the objects to 
which it had become attached” (2002, 190). In other words, this 
phase is where the aspirant detaches from his conventional, and 
often vicious, likes and dislikes. As such “Concentration of the I” 
often involved exercises wherein the aspirant denies himself plea-
sures that he has been habituated to. For instance, Platonic askesis 
“consisted of renouncing the pleasures of the flesh and adopting a 
specific dietary regime” (190). The Cynic askesis on the other hand 
“advocated enduring hunger, cold, and insults, as well as eliminating 
all luxury, comfort, and artifices of civilization, in order to culti vate 
independence and stamina” (190). Besides these activities that had to 
do with the body, askesis also heavily involved the mind. Such men-
tal exercises included the continuous recollection of and meditation 
on precisely the principles which remind the aspirant that he should 
not attach himself to his base desires. Such principles might be in the 
form of a concise maxim as already shown above. It might also be 
articulated in a more elaborate way such as Marcus Aurelius’ 
description of the repulsiveness of the conventional pleasures of 
food, clothing, and sex, as seen in his Meditations: 
This is the carcass of a fish; this of a bird; and this of a hog. And again 
more generally; This phalernum, this excellent highly commended 
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wine, is but the bare juice of an ordinary grape. This purple robe, but 
sheep’s hairs, dyed with the blood of shellfish. So for coitus, it is but 
the attrition of an ordinary base entrail, and the excretion of a little 
vile snivel, with a certain kind of convulsion. (Aurelius 1800, 79–80)
The purpose of this graphic depiction is to engage the emotions 
and imagination of the aspirant and not just his understanding. In 
this way, the aspirant is indeed transformed in a holistic fashion. 
As Hadot says (1995, 85): “We must also associate our imagination 
and affectivity with the training of our thought. Here, we must bring 
into play all the psychagogic techniques and rhetorical methods of 
amplification. We must formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the 
most striking and concrete way.” When it comes to the Aristotelian 
school, the collaborative and dialectic study of nature may also be 
understood as askesis in the sense that one is led outside of one’s 
own personal biases towards a more objective view of reality.
This more objective or universal view is then what the “Concen-
tra tion of the I” should eventually lead to. That is to say, the “Expan-
sion of the I” is precisely when the self achieves “the perspective of the 
whole” mentioned above. Having detached from his conventional 
biases and desires, the aspirant now becomes free to grasp the totality 
of the universe and his relation to it. This then leads to the sense of 
becoming one with the universe or of seeing things from the universal 
point of view. Intimations of “Expansion of the I” can be seen from 
what Aristotle says in Parts of Animals:
There is a story which tells how some visitors once wished to meet 
Heracleitus [sic], and when they entered and saw him in the kitchen, 
warming himself at the stove, they hesitated; but Heracleitus said, 
“Come in; don’t be afraid; there are gods even here.” In like manner, we 
ought not to hesitate nor to be abashed, but boldly to enter upon our 
researches concerning animals of every sort and kind, knowing that 
in not one of them is Nature or Beauty lacking. (Aristotle 1937, 101)
The context of this passage is that Aristotle is responding to a claim 
that the study of animals will involve exploring unattractive things 
since some animals appear repulsive to humans. Aristotle’s reply is 
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that the student with a truly philosophic spirit will see that beauty is 
in all animals because he will realize that even the meanest of them 
are nature’s works of art and, ultimately, the effect of the divine first 
causes. In other words, because such a student has transcended 
his own conventionally human point of view, he will be able to see 
things from a universal perspective. And this perspective precisely 
shows that the presence and beauty of the divine can be found even 
in the seemingly ugliest of animals, just like how Heraclitus saw the 
gods in all things (Hadot 2002, 85–86). This universal perspective 
is also indicated in the Theaetetus where Socrates describes the 
philosopher’s mind as being “borne in all directions . . . ‘both below 
the earth,’ and measuring the surface of the earth, and ‘above the 
sky,’ studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of 
everything that is, each in its entirety” (Theaetetus 173e–174a; Plato 
1921, 121). In the Republic too, Socrates describes the philosophical 
person as seeking “integrity and wholeness in all things human and 
divine” (Republic 486a; Plato [1935] 1942, 9). 
The Stoics and Epicureans also write in like terms. Lucretius (1910, 
29) de scribes Epicurus as one who was able to “burst through the 
close-set bolts upon the door of nature,” and to pass “far beyond the 
fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traverse . . . the bound-
less whole.” Lucretius (1910, 107) describes his own philosophical 
experience in the same manner, saying, “The terrors of the mind fly 
away, the walls of the world part asunder, I see things moving on 
through all the void . . . nature is made so clear and manifest, laid bare 
to sight on every side.” on the other hand, Marcus Aurelius re minds 
himself of this ideal of unity with the universe in his Meditations: “Let 
this then be thy first ground, that thou art part of that universe, which 
is governed by nature. Then secondly, that to those parts that are of 
the same kind and nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred” 
(Aurelius 1800, 69). Interestingly, a consequence of this unity is 
im provement of moral relations towards others. As Aurelius says:
As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an [sic] universe,  
I shall not be displeased with anything that happens. And as I have 
relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and 
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nature that I am, so I shall be careful to do nothing that is prejudicial 
to the community, but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my 
kind ever be; and the common good, that, which all my intentions and 
resolutions shall drive unto, as that which is contrary unto it, I shall 
by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid. (Aurelius 1800, 70) 
This squares with Hadot’s understanding that philosophy as a way of 
life also aims to perfect our relations with our fellow human beings, 
and that this perfection “culminates in love and respect for others” 
(2002, 220). Indeed, Hadot even believes that the motivation behind 
choosing schools of philosophy is ultimately “the love of mankind” 
(220). This “social” motivation also helps give context to the spiritual 
exercises themselves in that these are not really done by the philo-
sophical aspirants alone. Rather, these are facilitated to them by their 
teachers who in turn see their vocation as including the task of bet-
tering their fellow human beings precisely because of the philoso-
phers’ love of mankind (220). 
IV. Mencius’ Philosophy as a Way of Life
1. Philosophical Background
Mencius (372–289 BC) is widely regarded as the philosophical suc-
cessor of Confucius who both defended and enhanced the latter’s 
thought. Perhaps a brief description of Confucius’ philosophy is 
appropriate then before continuing. Confucius (551–479 BC) lived 
during the “Spring and Autumn” period of Ancient China. This was 
an age where the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC) was declining in 
political power. Real control over China no longer belonged to the 
king but to the feudal lords and ministers who gradually usurped 
power from him. one way this usurpation manifested was through 
their appropriation of ritual activities that were meant only for the 
king.2 More seriously however, were the frequent wars that the feudal 
 2 Confucius would often criticize these acts of appropriation. See Analects 3.1, 3.2, 3.7; 
Confucius (2003, 17–18).
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states waged against each other in hopes of gaining more territory 
and power. Many would perish and be reduced to destitution 
because of this constant belligerence. In light of this cultural and 
moral decay, Confucius proposed his own ethical vision—indeed his 
own dao (道) or “Way” of life—that would hopefully rejuvenate soci-
ety. This vision mainly aimed for development of moral virtues fore-
most of which was ren (仁), which can be understood as goodness or 
benevolence (Confucius 2003, 238). There are in turn two means to 
cultivate these virtues. The first is by practicing such virtues in the 
family setting. For Confucius, the family is where one first experienc-
es and learns virtuous behavior (Analects 1.1; Confucius 2003, 1). 
Thus it is by being consistent in one’s virtuous treatment of one’s 
family that one might become a moral being. The second means of 
cultivating virtue is by devoting one’s self to the formative elements 
of traditional Zhou culture (Slingerland 2009, 117–120). This specifi-
cally means reading and reflecting on texts traditionally regarded as 
resources for moral education, and by learning proper ritual con-
duct. Unfortunately, despite his attempts, Confucius was not able to 
get himself employed by those in power and thus he could not bring 
about his vision. Still his teachings and aspirations lived on in his 
disciples and would ultimately be passed on to Mencius.
Mencius however, who lived more than a century after Confu-
cius, faced a quite different challenge than that of the latter. Aside 
from the chaos still being brought about by the Zhou’s decline, Men-
cius also had to contend with other schools of philosophy which had 
developed after Confucius’ death (Mencius 3B9.9–9.10; Mencius 
2008, 85). These schools questioned the legitimacy of the Confucian 
Way in many respects. For the sake of brevity, let me cite only one of 
their most pressing criticisms, namely, the necessity of Con fucian rit-
uals for human flourishing. one school of philosophy, Mohism, criti-
cized Confucian rituals as a waste of resources and manpower. For 
instance, Confucius promoted the traditional ob servance of a three-
year mourning period after the death of one’s parents (Analects 17.21; 
Confucius 2003, 209–210). For Confucius this was the ritually appro-
priate display of the virtue of filial piety. The Mohists however argued 
that such a practice leads to incredible unproductivity and that it is 
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ultimately detrimental to the well-being of the community (Fraser 
2009, 149). Another school of philosophy, Yangism, indirectly put into 
question Confucian rituals through its theory that humans are natu-
rally egoistic (Mencius 7A26; Mencius 2008, 178). For the Yangists, 
what is most natural for a human being is to preserve his own body. 
As such, other-regarding attitudes, like the Confucian virtues, should 
be shunned. This of course entailed that the entire Confucian pro-
gram of moral development, including performance of traditional 
rituals, are “unnatural” and thus should not be carried out.
It was in the face of these threats that Mencius articulated the 
philosophical idea he is most famous for, namely, that human nature 
is good (Mencius 6A6; Mencius 2008, 149–150). By this he meant 
that, contrary to the Yangists, humans have in their hearts natural 
other- regarding feelings such as compassion and respect. These 
feelings, along with human nature itself, are given to man by Heaven, 
the supreme cosmic and normative power which Mencius some-
times equated with the world (Mencius 2B1; Mencius 2008, 50). To 
show that humans have these other-regarding feelings naturally, 
Mencius posed his famous thought experiment of a child about 
to fall in a well (Mencius 2A6.3; Mencius 2008, 46). For Mencius, 
anyone who sees such a child would surely feel a sense of alarm 
and com passion. And these feelings would not be prompted by cal-
culated, self-serving motives such as wanting praise for saving the 
child or annoyance at the child’s cries should he fall. Rather, the feel-
ings would be spontaneous and would intend the child’s well-being 
itself. It was this idea of human nature’s goodness that Mencius 
utilized to defend the Con fucian Way. For him, the other-regarding 
feelings, al though indicating the goodness of human nature, were 
not yet its full actualization. He compared these feelings to sprouts 
that needed further cultivation in order to “grow” into moral virtues 
such as benevolence (Mencius 2A6.5–6.7; Mencius 2008, 46–47). And 
the means to cul tivate them was precisely the Confucian Way. So for 
example, all human beings have indeed the natural feeling of com-
passion. However, because it is just a feeling it can be inconsistent 
and the person experiencing the feeling might also not be able to 
express it in the proper manner. The Confucian Way then could help 
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develop these feelings into virtues by galvanizing a person to habitu-
ally engage in compassionate or caring acts, beginning with those 
whom he already cares for, such as his family. Through this, the feel-
ing of compassion will mature into the primary Confucian virtue of 
benevolence. Moreover, by educating a person in traditional ritual 
forms, Confucianism provides the proper, culturally-approved man-
ner in which one could express these feelings. It was in this way then 
that Mencius defended Confucian rituals, that is to say, these served 
as a means to develop and express the moral capacities of human 
nature. Thus they were worth investing and participating in, despite 
the high material cost they might entail. 
 
2. Philosophical Discourse in Mencius
Let me now proceed to how Mencius’ philosophy appears to fit 
with Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of life. As men-
tioned above, one of the characteristics of Ancient Greco-Roman 
philosophy which indicates that it is a way of life, is that it aims 
primarily at transforming a person and only secondarily at phi lo-
sophical discourse. Does Mencius’ philosophizing have a similar 
characteristic? I believe so, and this can be seen in what Steven Geisz 
(2008, 191–194) considers to be Mencius’ “strategic-pragmatic” view of 
language. For Geisz, this means that Mencius’ use of language “treats 
truth and descriptive adequacy as secondary to the shaping of his 
audience’s behavior by any means available—so long as these means 
are consistent with the overall Confucian dao he is promoting” (2008, 
192). Geisz’ hypothesis stems from two bases. one is the opinion of 
cer tain contemporary scholars that Classical Chinese philosophy 
“held a conception of language that saw it as having an overriding 
function of regulating behavior” (Geisz 2008, 191). This is a corollary 
of another commonly agreed characteristic of Classical Chinese 
philosophy, namely, its emphasis on the practical/ethical (Slingerland 
2003, 3). The second and more significant basis is Mencius’ own 
words. There are several instances where what Men cius says hints or 
indicates that his view of language is indeed strategic-pragmatic. one 
example is his awareness of his own task. When it was made known 
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to him that he was considered as someone “fond of [philosophical] 
disputation,” Mencius passionately replies:
How can I be fond of disputation? I simply cannot do otherwise. 
. . . If the Ways of Yang Zhu and Mozi [the founders of Yangism 
and Mohism respectively] do not cease, and the Way of Kongzi 
[Confucius] is not made evident, then evil doctrines will dupe the 
people and obstruct benevolence and righteousness. . . . Because I 
fear this, I preserve the Way of the former sages, fend off Yang Zhu 
and Mozi, and get rid of specious words, so that evil doctrines will 
be unable to arise. If they arise in one’s heart, they are harmful in 
one’s activities. If they arise in one’s activities, they are harmful in 
governing. . . . How could I be fond of disputation? I simply cannot 
do otherwise.3 (Mencius 3B9.1–9.14; Mencius 2008, 83–86)
Here Mencius explicitly says that his main goal is to promote the 
Con fucian Way and that this is the reason why he engages in debate 
with the other philosophical schools. In other words, what is most 
important for him is the way people live and how such ways-of-life 
might be transformed, for better or for worse. Philosophical dis-
course was contingent on this primary goal and was not meant to be 
engaged in for its own sake.
Perhaps a more explicit indication of Mencius’ use of strategic- 
pragmatic language is when he talks about how the morally accom-
plished person or “gentleman” should speak (Geisz 2008, 199–201). 
Mencius says: 
The mouth in relation to flavors, the eyes in relation to sights, the 
ears in relation to notes, the nose in relation to odors, the four limbs 
in relation to comfort—these are matters of human nature, but they 
are also fated. Nonetheless, a gentleman does not refer to them as 
“human nature.” Benevolence between father and son, righteousness 
between ruler and minister, propriety between guest and host . . . 
these are fated, but they also involve human nature. Nonetheless, a 
3	 予豈好辯哉? 予不得已也 . . . 楊墨之道不息, 孔子之道不著, 是邪說誣民, 充塞仁義也 . . . 吾為此懼, 閑先聖之
道，距楊墨, 放淫辭, 邪說者不得作. 作於其心, 害於其事; 作於其事, 害於其政 . . . 豈好辯哉? 予不得已也.
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gentleman does not refer to them as “fated.”4 (Mencius 7B24.1–4.2;  
Mencius 2008, 189)
To understand this passage, a closer look at the concepts of “nature 
(xing 性)” and “fate (ming 命)” is needed. Mencius’ idea of nature can 
already be gleaned from what he says above about the other-regard-
ing feelings of human beings since these feelings are merely his 
more specific description of human nature. Again, these feelings are 
inherent in human beings but can be further developed into virtues 
through participation in the Confucian Way. Thus nature for Men-
cius can be understood as something inherent that can be further 
cultivated or perfected through human agency. As for fate, Mencius 
has this to say: “When no one extends to it, yet it is reached—this is 
fate”5 (Mencius 5A6.2; Mencius 2008, 125). This means that fate is 
some thing that is achieved even without the intervention of human 
agency, that is to say, it is something inevitable. In the above passage, 
what Mencius seems to be saying is that both a human being’s sen-
suous and moral inclinations are natural (meaning they are inherent 
but can be further cultivated) and are fated (meaning they will in -
evitably arise at one point). However, in order to urge people to live 
according to the Confucian Way, it is not sensuous inclinations that 
should be cultivated but moral ones. Therefore, the gentleman should 
not speak of moral inclinations as if they are fated and require no 
effort to bring about. Conversely, he should not call sensuous incli-
nations natural, lest the idea arise that these inclinations should be 
the ones to be cultivated.6 This meaning of the passage then suggests 
two things about Mencius. First is that he is consciously painting an 
inaccurate picture of human nature whenever he talks about it as 
being good by virtue of possessing the four sprouts. This is because 
he knows that humans also have non-moral feelings or inclinations 
that are just as natural. The second is that the reason behind this 
inaccurate portrayal is his belief that motivating people to follow the 
 4 口之於味也, 目之於色也, 耳之於聲也, 鼻之於臭也, 四肢之於安佚也, 性也, 有命焉, 君子不謂性也. 仁之於父子也, 
義之於君臣也, 禮之於賓主也, 智之於賢者也, 聖人之於天道也, 命也, 有性焉, 君子不謂命也. 
 5 莫之致而至者, 命也.
 6 See also Geisz (2008, 199–200) and Mencius (2008, 189–190).
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Confucian way is more important than giving a faithful philosophi-
cal anthropology. In other words, for Mencius, living out a philosophy 
is primary while philosophical discourse is secondary.
one last area where Mencius’ strategic-pragmatic use of lan-
guage can be inferred is from his very manner of debating with rival 
philosophers. An example would be Mencius’ disputation with Gaozi 
(Mencius 6A1.1–4.5; Mencius 2008, 143–147). This debate is especially 
significant because this is where Mencius’ theory of the goodness of 
human nature appears prominently. However, modern scholars 
have expressed their disappointment in how this most distinctive 
idea of Mencian philosophy should be defended by the philosopher 
himself in such a dismal way (Hansen 1992, 154; Waley 1939, 68). 
Indeed, just as Ancient Greco-Roman philosophy might be criticized 
by contemporary thinkers for lack of being systematic and logically 
consistent, current scholars of Chinese thought have also criticized 
Mencius for his apparently incompetent argumentation. For one 
thing, both Mencius and Gaozi in talking about human nature mostly 
use analogies. According to Arthur Waley, however, such analogies 
are irrelevant, “most of which can be used to disprove what they are 
intended to prove” (1939, 68). Human nature is, for instance, com-
pared to water. For Gaozi, human nature is ethically neutral and 
can be made either good or bad depending on external influence. 
This is like water which has no inherent direction but can be made 
to flow either right or left depending on the path that is carved for it. 
How ever, Mencius’ response is that water has an inherent direction, 
namely downwards, and that human nature’s tendency towards good- 
 ness is like this downward tendency. Although Mencius might score 
points at being witty enough to use his opponent’s metaphor to his 
own advantage, ultimately the response obviously does not “prove” 
that human nature is good since it is all based on (irrelevant) analogy. 
For Geisz though, Mencius might not have really been aiming at 
giving a robust argument for the goodness of human nature. Rather, 
he might simply have wanted his audience to consider and be inspired 
by the idea that human nature is good—and indeed his audience will 
likely be led to do so since Mencius appears as the “winner” of the 
debate (Geisz 2008, 208). Something similar can apply to the aforesaid 
60  Volume 34 /Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture
thought experiment on the child falling into a well. As Geisz states, 
although Mencius says that everyone would naturally experience the 
feeling of compassion and alarm upon seeing the child, he does not 
actually give reasons to support that claim (2008, 209–210). In other 
words, Mencius merely asserts that all hu mans are naturally compas-
sionate without arguing for it. Again it might be inferred that what 
Mencius really intended is for people to simply consider the idea and 
be galvanized by it. Indeed, perhaps Mencius intended the thought 
experiment to serve a similar purpose to that of the Stoic maxims, 
namely, a way for aspirants to be re minded of the goal of their philo-
sophy, which in the case of Confucianism is living compassionately 
and benevolently. 
3. Spiritual Exercise in Mencius
As mentioned above, spiritual exercises are the means to attain the 
ideal state posited by the philosophical schools, and these exercises 
can be divided into the two phases of Concentration and Expansion 
of the I. Mencius also has his “means” for one to be transformed 
more into the Confucian ideal. Specifically, Mencius proposes a 
practice that might be called “reflection and extension” in order to 
develop the natural moral potential of the human being. I believe 
that this practice resonates with the “Concentration of the I” that 
Hadot speaks of as the first phase of spiritual exercises. on the 
other hand, Mencius also speaks of how the effect of this reflection 
and extension (and practicing the Confucian Way in general) leads 
to a state of greater unity with the universe. I believe this parallels 
Hadot’s “Expansion of the I.” Let me begin first with “reflection 
and extension.” Perhaps one of the clearest instances where this 
practice can be seen is the story of Mencius’ dialogue with King Xuan 
concerning an ox (Mencius 1A7.3–7.13; Mencius 2008, 7–11). I will 
start with that part of the story which portrays “reflection.” Mencius 
meets King Xuan and the latter asks whether he has what it takes 
to become caring towards his people and in that way become a 
true king. The king asks this because he does not himself believe he 
can become this kind of person, considering that he has many self-
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serving vices such as fondness for belligerence, sexual pleasure, and 
material wealth. Mencius, however, believes that the king indeed 
has what it takes to become a caring person. The king asks how, 
and Mencius replies by telling him about an incident that he has 
heard wherein the king supposedly spared an ox about to be ritually 
sacrificed, and instead substituted it for a lamb. Mencius asks if this 
incident is true and the king answers in the affirmative. Mencius 
then replies that this is proof that the king’s heart has what it takes 
to become caring since this shows that it, as with the hearts of all 
human beings, has the natural feeling of compassion. Mencius also 
says that that the explanation given by other people for the king 
sparing the ox—namely that the king did it out of stinginess—is false. 
This makes the king realize that he himself did not know why he 
spared the ox. This, in turn, prompts him to recall and re-examine 
the incident so that he could know what indeed his motivation was. 
After a moment of introspection, he agrees with Mencius that indeed 
he spared the ox out of compassion. He then praises Mencius for 
helping him understand his heart.
In this dialogue, Mencius leads King Xuan to precisely “reflect” on 
an instance where he showed compassion. This entails remembering 
the instance but also examining it in such a way that the one who 
reflects might attain some moral insight about it which he did not 
have previously. In fact, the insight that the king gains is that he is not 
someone whose feelings and desires only correspond to base plea-
sures like sensuality and wealth. Rather, he also has the “heart” or 
moral feeling of compassion (Slingerland 2003, 142). This fits with 
Hadot’s description of “Concentration of the I” which again is “the 
movement by which the ‘I’ concentrates itself upon itself and dis-
covers that it is not what it had thought” (2002, 190). Moreover, the 
king has also arguably realized that this feeling of compassion is 
most natural to him. This is because, through reflecting, the king real-
izes that his feeling of compassion was so spontaneous that he did 
not even know that such a feeling was the motive behind his sparing 
of the ox (Slingerland 2003, 143). In other words, he dis covers that his 
feeling of compassion is something inherent or natural. This can then 
galvanize the king to develop this natural moral feeling and also 
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inspire him to distance himself from his immoral inclinations, since 
now he has become aware that there is more to his nature than these 
inclinations. This, again, fits with Hadot’s description of “Concentra-
tion of the I,” where the self “ceases to be conflated with the objects to 
which it had become attached” (2002, 190).
The dialogue however is not yet done. The question remains as to 
how the king can develop this natural moral feeling. This is where 
the notion of “extension” comes in. After praising Mencius for help-
ing him discover his heart, King Xuan then asks how this would 
suffice to become a true king who cares for his subjects. Mencius, 
who by now seems to be a philosophical mentor facilitating askesis 
to his student, replies by giving analogies. He compares the king’s 
ability to show compassion to an ox but not his people, to someone 
who claims to be able to lift 500 pounds but not a feather, and also 
to someone who claims to see the tip of an autumn hair but not a 
wagon of firewood. Mencius then claims that in all these cases the 
failure to do something stems not from lack of ability but from 
unwillingness. The king then asks how one can distinguish from 
these two. Mencius replies by saying that tucking Mount Tai under 
one’s arm and leaping over the North Sea is something one is truly 
unable to do. However, collecting kindling for an elderly person is 
something one is able to do and thus one who claims to be unable to 
do it is really just unwilling. Mencius then says that the king’s un -
willingness to be caring to his people is analogous to this latter case. 
Here we see that Mencius employs both logical reasoning and ex -
aggerated imagery (carrying a mountain, jumping over the sea) to 
convince the king that he is indeed capable of exercising compas-
sion to his people and thus become a true king. This can be related to 
what Hadot (1995, 85) mentioned above on how spiritual exercises 
should use “all the psychagogic techniques and rhetorical methods 
of amplification” in effecting transformation. Finally Mencius says: 
Treat your elders as elders, and extend it to the elders of others; treat 
your young ones as young ones, and extend it to the young ones of 
others, and you can turn the world in the palm of your hand. The 
Odes say, “He set an example for his little woman, It extended to 
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his brothers, and so he controlled his clan and state.” This means 
that he simply took this feeling and applied it to that. Hence, if one 
extends one’s kindness, it will be sufficient to care for all within the 
Four Seas. If one does not extend one’s kindness, one will lack the 
wherewithal to care for ones’ wife and children. That in which the 
ancients greatly exceeded others was no other than this. They were 
simply good at extending what they did. In the present case your 
kindness is sufficient to reach animals, but the effects do not reach 
the commoners. Why is this case alone different?7 (Mencius 1A7.12; 
Mencius 2008, 11)
Here we see Mencius suggests a way of proceeding in which the king 
can more easily cultivate his care for others. This is by using his care 
for those whom he already loves (or finds easy to love) as an analogy 
for caring for others. Indeed, this is arguably what Mencius has been 
doing all along in making the king reflect on the ox in cident. In other 
words, Mencius wants the king to reflect on those instances where 
he felt care, and through this reflection, galvanize himself (cognitively 
and affectively) into, precisely, extending this care to those whom he 
has not yet learned to care for. Through this method, one can habi-
tuate oneself in virtue and thus becomes less identified with one’s 
previous conventional (and vicious) state. This, again, can be consid-
ered as part of “Concentration of the I.”
There is also an element in Mencius’ philosophy that corre-
sponds to the “Expansion of the I.” Again, this expansion is the out-
come of living out the practices included in the “Concentration of 
the I,” and it entails gaining a sense of unity with the universe. For 
Mencius, unity with the universe or Heaven seems to be the ultimate 
outcome of understanding and exercising the moral nature of the 
heart. This is hinted when he says that the gentleman or morally 
accomplished person “flows with Heaven above and Earth below”8 
(Mencius 7A13.3; Mencius 2008, 174). Now the reason for this is that, 
 7 老吾老, 以及人之老; 幼吾幼, 以及人之幼. 天下可運於掌.《詩》云:『刑于寡妻, 至于兄弟, 以御于家邦.』言舉
斯心加諸彼而已. 故推恩足以保四海, 不推恩無以保妻子. 古之人所以大過人者無他焉, 善推其所為而已矣. 今
恩足以及禽獸, 而功不至於百姓者, 獨何與? 
 8 上下與天地同流.
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as said above, human nature and its moral feelings are given by 
Heaven. Thus by cultivating this nature one aligns with Heaven’s will 
and by extension the way of the universe. Mencius more explicitly 
states this when he says: 
To fully fathom one’s heart is to understand nature. To understand 
one’s nature is to understand Heaven. To preserve one’s heart and 
nourish one’s nature is the way to serve Heaven. To not become 
conflicted over the length of one’s life but to cultivate oneself and 
await one’s fate is the way to take one’s stand on fate.9 (Mencius 
7A1.1–1.3; Mencius 2008, 171)
Here Mencius portrays that a person’s ideal state is in thoroughly 
understanding and activating his nature, which simultaneously 
means being cognitively and volitionally united with Heaven, the 
force that guides the universe. Since one is united with that which 
guides everything, one need not worry even about death. 
Perhaps Mencius’ most elaborate statement that implies “Expan-
sion of the I” is when he discusses his “floodlike qi” to his disciple 
Gongsun Chou. It is best to cite the entire dialogue:
Gongsun Chou next asked, “May I ask wherein you excel, Master?” 
Mencius replied, “I understand doctrines. I am good at cultivating 
my floodlike qi. Gongsun Chou continued, “May I ask what is meant 
by ‘floodlike qi?’ Mencius replied, “It is difficult to explain. It is a qi 
that is supremely great and supremely unyielding. If one cultivates 
it with uprightness and does not harm it, it will fill up the space 
between Heaven and Earth. . . . It is produced by accumulated 
righteousness. It cannot be obtained by a seizure of righteousness. 
If some of one’s actions leave one’s heart unsatisfied, it will starve.10 
(Mencius 2A11–14; Mencius 2008, 38–39)
What Mencius means has been the subject of much discussion among 
interpreters. The concept of “qi” itself might prove difficult to under-
 
 9 盡其心者, 知其性也. 知其性, 則知天矣. 存其心, 養其性, 所以事天也. 殀壽不貳, 修身以俟之, 所以立命也.
10 敢問夫子惡乎長? 曰:我知言, 我善養吾浩然之氣. 敢問何謂浩然之氣? 曰:難言也. 其為氣也, 至大至剛, 以直養
而無害, 則塞于天地之閒 . . . 是集義所生者, 非義襲而取之也. 行有不慊於心, 則餒矣.
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stand for those outside of East Asian culture. Among English trans-
lations it has been described variously as “ether,” “material force,” 
and “psychophysical stuff” (Mencius 2008, xxxviii). Indeed qi has 
been understood differently by Chinese philosophers themselves 
depending on the time in which they lived. According to Bryan Van 
Norden, at least in Mencius’ era, qi was understood as “a kind of fluid, 
found in the atmosphere and in the human body, closely connected to 
the kind and intensity of one’s emotional reaction” (Mencius 2008, 
xxxviii). Perhaps a simple way of understanding qi is to consider it the 
equivalent of “air” in the common saying “There is tension in the air.” 
This example indicates the reciprocal relationship between qi and 
emotion. Similar to how a tense air can both be caused by and cause, 
strong emotions, qi is also something that is produced and produces 
emotion (Mencius 2008, xxxviii–xxxix). In Mencius’ quote above, he 
implies that the “floodlike qi” is produced by the satisfaction that 
comes with doing righteous deeds. Even tually, if further cultivated, 
this qi would permeate all the world. This can be understood to mean 
that living out the Confucian Way, through cultivation of the nascent 
moral feeling by way of “reflection and extension,” would ultimately 
lead to a feeling of oneness with the universe. This process must be 
continuous and the Confucian aspirant must be unflagging in living a 
righteous life according to his philosophy. Still the reward in the end 
appears worth the undertaking since one will be able to experience a 
supreme, mystical, kind of joy in being united to all. This can be seen 
when Mencius says, “All the 10,000 things are there in me. There is no 
greater joy than to find, on self-examination, that I am true to myself”11 
(Mencius 7A4.1; Mencius 2003, 146).
V. Mencius’ Distinctiveness
Despite fitting into Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of 
life, there are still features of Mencius’ philosophy that distinguishes 
it from its Ancient Greco-Roman counterparts. one such feature is 
11 萬物皆備於我矣. 反身而誠, 樂莫大焉.
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its “other-orientedness.” By “other-orientedness,” I simply mean that 
Mencius’ philosophy chiefly aims to lead people towards enhancing 
the well-being of others. This can be seen in the highest value of the 
Mencian Way, namely, ren or benevolence, which in turn is a virtue of 
being good to others. This is unlike some schools of Ancient Greco-
Roman philosophy which tend to ultimately aim at individual well-
being, like personal tranquility (Long [1974] 1986, 4).12 This difference 
has implications for the spiritual exercises of these philosophies 
and how they are understood. For instance, Stoic askesis includes 
detachment from material pleasure as could be seen in the above 
example of Aurelius’ Meditations. This is in the service of attaining 
the goal in Stoicism which is the aforesaid tranquillity. In other words, 
the Stoic must detach himself from external goods so that he will be 
unperturbed by their possible loss and therefore have indestructible 
inner tranquility (Aurelius 2007, 130). on the other hand, Mencius 
also speaks about reducing desires for material pleasure. However 
this is not because it ultimately impedes one’s personal tranquility but 
because excessively entertaining these desires distracts a person from 
cultivating oneself to be benevolent (Mencius 6A14–15.2; Mencius 
2008, 155–156). Mencius would on occasion even encourage people 
to enjoy material goods as long as they share these with the less-
fortunate (Mencius 1A2.1–2.3; Mencius 2008, 2–3).
 Another differentiating feature between Mencius and some An -
cient Greco-Roman philosophies would be the kind of knowledge 
that they ultimately strove for. For some schools in antiquity, the 
knowledge that is most sought for is that of immaterial, immutable, 
universal entities, such as the forms in the case of Platonism. on the 
12 This does not necessarily contradict Hadot’s claim above that philosophers were 
motivated by “love of mankind” because the goal of a philosophy can be distinct from 
what motivates a person to pursue it. For instance, although Stoicism may have as a 
goal one’s individual tranquility, the Stoic aspirant might pursue Stoicism so that he 
can teach others how to attain this tranquility, out of love for them. This also need 
not go against Hadot’s other claim that living out Ancient Greco-Roman philosophies 
“culminates in love and respect for others” because this can be an effect of the 
philosophy’s main goal. For example, attaining Stoic tranquility might lead to a more 
enhanced love of neighbor because one is free from needless anxieties that hamper 
one’s care for others.
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other hand, followers of Mencius would have likely prized a sort 
of empathic practical wisdom that allowed them to respond with 
proper benevolence in a given situation. Again, this difference shows 
in the spiritual exercises of the respective philosophies. In the Phae­
do, Socrates talks about what is arguably a spiritual exercise, namely, 
“purification.” He says: 
The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy . . . 
encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes 
and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to 
withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, 
and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to 
trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract 
existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees 
by other means . . . since everything of that kind is visible and ap-
prehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is 
invisible. . . . Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it 
must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from 
pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears. (Phaedo 82d–83b; Plato 
[1914] 2005, 289) 
Here it can be inferred that purification is an activity where the as pi-
rant attempts to bar from his consciousness all sensory data in order 
to focus more on non-sensory objects or concepts. He also detaches 
himself from any dispositions related to sensory o bjects so that he is 
indifferent from the “lusts and griefs and fears” that these objects 
might cause him. The purpose of this purification is to allow the soul 
to ultimately behold the non-sensory essences or forms of things. In 
contrast to Platonic purification, the Mencian exercise of “reflection” 
very much utilizes sensory data in the act of reflective remembering. 
King Xuan in recollecting the scene where he showed compassion to 
the ox would of course recount the scene’s sensory properties. Also, 
in contrast to the Platonic aspirant who detaches not only from the 
sensory data but also from the dispositions or emotions associated 
with it, King Xuan would likely rekindle the feeling of compassion 
that he felt during that scene because the emotion is triggered by the 
scene and is part of it. Furthermore, unlike purification, the practice 
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of reflection aims to build in King Xuan the ability, not to see immate-
rial essences, but to respond to future cases that require compassion 
since by repeatedly remembering one scenario where he showed 
compassion, he might realize how other scenarios are similar to it.13 
Thus the exercise of reflection ultimately contributes to the above-
mentioned empathic practical wisdom valued by the Mencian Way.
Related to this, another difference between Mencius’ philosophy 
and that of its more theoretical Greco-Roman counterparts is that, 
for the latter, one way of “Expanding the I” is through scientific study 
of the universe. By doing this the philosopher is led to transcend the 
smallness of his humanity and enlarge himself by seeing things from 
the universal point of view. The abovementioned description of the 
philosopher in the Theaetetus, as well as Aristotle’s account of the 
study of animals, already implies this. Another example is the Stoic 
Seneca’s defence of physics. He says: 
“[The philosopher’s mind] watches the rising and the setting of the 
stars, and their differing and harmonious paths; it observes where 
each star first reveals its light to earth, where its zenith . . . is, to what 
point it descends. . . . To look into all this, to learn about it, to brood 
over it—is this not to transcend one’s mortality and be registered 
with a higher status? ‘What use will that be to you?’ you say. If 
nothing else, at least this: I shall know that everything is puny when 
I have measured god.” (Seneca 2010, 138–139)
In contrast, studying the cosmos as means to expand one’s self seems 
to be absent from Mencius’ thought. For him, it is by accumulating 
righteous deeds that one’s qi expands to fill the world. Again, Mencius 
is not precise in describing this process but if a little speculation is 
allowed, this is how I think it goes: As the Mencian aspirant becomes 
more successful in following Heaven by practicing virtue, he becomes 
more familiar or attuned precisely to the ways of Heaven. However, 
since Heaven’s order permeates the world, then this leads also to a 
familiarity with the world itself. To use an analogy, and one that is 
13 See Ivanhoe (2002, 221–236).
The Philosophy of Mencius as a Way of Life  69 
inspired by Mencius,14 imagine a person who has just been newly 
introduced to a dance. This person will initially feel unfamiliar and 
even alienated from the dance and his fellow dancers. But as he prac-
tices the dance more, his familiarity with it increases. This sense of 
familiarity then gives him a feeling of confidence and of being “at 
home” with the dance and his fellow dancers. This feeling in turn 
encourages him towards further mastering the dance. Eventually, he 
might achieve such a high appreciation and mastery of it, that when-
ever he dances, he no longer experiences any incongruence between 
his self on the one hand, and his fellow dancers and the dance itself on 
the other. In a manner of speaking, he has become “one” with them. 
This, in turn, might be similar to experience of the Mencian aspirant. 
The more he follows the ways of Heaven, the more he attains a famil-
iarity with it and all things. This feeling of familiarity then produces 
the “air” or qi of being at home with the cosmos. Nonetheless, this air 
is not just a product of the feeling of familiarity. Rather, it also pro-
duces such a feeling, which in turn encourages the aspirant to further 
alignment with the ways of Heaven. This process ultimately culmi-
nates in the experience of being one with all things. In summary, 
the Mencian “Expansion of the I” is distinct from its Ancient Greco- 
Roman counterparts because it is not brought about by attaining 
scientific knowledge of the universe. Rather, it seems to be the fruit of 
a practical and affective knowledge which might be the product, not 
just of being habituated in the normative ways of Heaven, but of actu-
ally enjoying such ways.
VI. Conclusion
In this article I have discussed how Mencius’ philosophy can be 
considered a way of life according to Pierre Hadot’s conception. 
That is to say, Mencius’ philosophy can be understood as a manner 
14 Mencius 4A27; Mencius (2008, 101). Mencius says: “If one delights in them [i.e., the 
virtues], then they grow. If they grow, then how can they be stopped? If they cannot be 
stopped, then one does not notice one’s feet dancing to them, one’s hands swaying to 
them.” 樂則生矣; 生則惡可已也, 惡可已, 則不知足之蹈之、手之舞之.
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of living that can holistically transform a person toward achieving 
unity with reality, or at the least, one’s fellow human beings. Due to 
humanity’s current predicament, where more than ever people have 
become polarized along racial, social, and cultural lines, perhaps it is 
high time for something like Mencius’ philosophy to be practiced as 
a way of life. At the least, perhaps some version of Mencian spiritual 
exercise, where one is cultivated to become more empathic toward 
others, might be conceptualized and made into a practice. And 
perhaps it is not only the Mencian way of life that requires reviving. 
The other ancient schools of philosophy can also provide guidance 
and comfort in these challenging times. After all, in these days 
where the prospect of returning to a normal way of life has become 
tenuous due to the pandemic, it seems that people could use Stoic 
tranquility to ease their anxieties and give them focus. To be sure, 
contemporary religions might also be able to provide what these 
philosophies purport to. Yet it is also true that not all people today 
have religious faith so that ancient philosophies might indeed still 
fill a need. But who will revive these ways of life from the dustbin 
of history? I believe that the most appropriate ones to do it are 
precisely those who are likely to have knowledge of them, that is 
to say, the philosophers. In other words, perhaps it is apropos for 
present-day philosophers to now return to what could likely have 
been the original meaning of their vocation.
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